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Abstract
Americans oldest past time, baseball, has turned into a multi- billion dollar industry under
Major League Baseball alone. Baseball is an entertainment industry that is driven by putting a
profitable, entertaining, and competitive product on the field to draw the fans to the games or
televisions. However, in the late 90’s, claims of a lack of competitive balance due to large
market team spending became loud and widespread. An uncompetitive and unentertaining
product would clearly cut into the profits of Major League Baseball. This was a fact that Bud
Selig was well aware of when he commissioned the Blue Ribbon Panel, a panel of experts, to
evaluate these claims in 2000. The Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that the claims of a growing
lack of competitive balance due to large market spending were correct. This conclusion lead Bud
Selig to revamp the revenue sharing and luxury tax structure of the league to put a more well
balanced product on the field. However, the Blue Ribbon Panel largely used wins to measure
competitive play. Wins, being a binary statistic, prevented a truly precise comparison between
the teams of the league to be made. This study aims to learn the story left untold by the Blue
Ribbon Panel and other academic studies of the 1990’s by creating a measure of team strength
based on the gambling markets perception of competitive play. After all, human perception of
competitive play is what the industry should be most concerned about. Using this newly created
measure of competitive play, this study observed a change in competitive balance, but could not
definitively link this change in competitive play with a growth in large market team spending.
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1.

Introduction

Drugs, unemployment, and income gap disparity sound like topics to be covered
in a current political debate, but also aptly describes Major League Baseball (MLB) in
the 1990s. Memories of Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire homerun trots overshadow the
on-the-field success of the New York Yankees and Atlanta Braves. Unfortunately,
memories of Mark McGwire standing in front of his locker being questioned about his
use of steroids and the subsequent concern of the use of steroids in professional sports are
remembered soon after. It was also the home of the only strike in American sports
history that caused the cancelation of an entire post season. Even with all this drama
surrounding the game, an age old political hotbed issue of the haves and have nots leaked
its way into baseball. The league was starting to lack competitive balance with the big
market teams seemingly outspending the small market teams to the point the small
market teams simply couldn’t compete on the field. Baseball is a marketplace that is
relatively unaffected by outside factors. Evaluating the effect of team spending in such a
market place is of particular interest to an economist and will be the subject of this paper.
In a traditional marketplace, firms compete with one another. Major League
Baseball differs in this aspect as it is more of a joint venture between 30 distinct firms.
The league can be seen as a joint venture because of the nature of the product being sold.
A marketable baseball game requires two teams to play and for both teams to be
competitive enough that fans will have an interest in watching the game. These two
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requirements give each team an interest in ensuring its competitors are profitable enough
to put together a competitive product on the field.
Further strengthening the joint venture aspect of Major League Baseball is the
rather protected market share each team enjoys from their geographic location and the
inability for firms to freely encroach on their geographic location. This negates much of
the need to drive competitors out of business. In fact, baseball teams have long been
divided into two groups based on their set geographic market: big market and small
market teams. The division of teams based on market size naturally arises in the sport,
as observed by the Blue Ribbon Panel, an average of 79% of team revenue comes from
local revenue sources (Levin et al.). The significance of teams deriving most of their
revenue from local revenue sources is highlighted when the size of the natural local
markets are taken into account. For example, in 1999 the Yankee’s local revenue was
$176 Million. This figure dwarfed the poorest team in the league, the Expos, who only
had a meager $12 million in local revenue (Levin et al.). Logically, higher revenue leads
to a higher ability to reinvest into the team payroll. This can be seen with the
corresponding drastic gap in payrolls with the Yankees spending $88 million compared to
the Expos spending a mere $16 million (USA News). While some of the gap in local
revenue could possibly be explained by the struggles of the Expos vs. the Yankees’ wild
success, the effect of being located in a large market cannot be discounted as seen by the
Los Angeles Dodgers with large local revenue of over $100 million despite having a
losing record. (Levin et. al.)
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Teams cannot freely choose their own location or else a clustering of teams
around a few big markets would likely occur. This creates a sizeable advantage that
some teams naturally have over others and a reason of concern for supporters of a level
playing field. On face value, Bud Selig and Major League Baseball did have reason to
listen to the fans’ complaints about the big market issue. In the latter part of the 1990’s,
the New York Yankees won 4 of 5 world championships. Perhaps, not coincidently,
during this same half of the decade the team payroll and revenue disparities were
reaching all time highs. Watching the New York Yankees increasingly put more money
into the their teams payroll and the corresponding on the field success that appeared to
produce, it is obvious why fans were concerned over the state of the league.
The perception of the fans about the diminishing level of competitive balance of
the league was shared by a report created by a Blue Ribbon Panel. This report, to be
discussed later in the paper, stated the large market teams were gaining a growing
advantage in the post strike years of the decade in the form of larger revenues and in turn
team payrolls. The report argued this trend was affecting the ability of the smaller market
teams to put competitive teams on the field with the large market teams buying a
disproportionate amount of the talent. The study suggested this was of alarming
importance due to the idea that Major League Baseball teams were not selling 30
individual products, but one combined product. This idea of one common product would
necessitate a need for reform on the financial side of the league to correct the imbalance
on the playing field. In fact, this thought process prompted Major League Baseball to
evaluate tools to put into place to ensure that the ability to put together a competitive
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team was not overly determined by market size. With the natural disadvantage faced by
small market teams, competitive balance promoting measures such as a luxury tax and
revenue sharing were championed by supporters of a more competitively balanced
league.
After the Blue Ribbon Panel’s report, a new revamped revenue sharing system
was installed in 2000 and a new luxury tax system was put in place in 2003. On face
value, these two tools used to promote competitive balance seem to have worked. Since
the 2001 MLB season, nine different teams have won a world series in eleven seasons.
This is a stark contrast to the Yankee-dominated late 1990s. Additionally, since the
installation of both tools, revenue and payroll disparities have narrowed. Based on the
casual observation of the seemingly increased competitive balance of the league in the
2000s with the decreased gap in team payrolls, a conclusion could be drawn that the
driving force behind competitive imbalance of the league was in fact the disparity of
payrolls. Whether this conclusion can be supported by more concrete evidence will be
examined in this paper.
Evaluating traditional statistics used in the Blue Ribbon Panel report such as wins
and playoff success, the story behind the seemingly growing lack of competitive play in
baseball seems clear cut. Large payroll disparities were leading to large disparities in the
quality of teams’ play on the field. However, these more traditional statistics are not
without their flaws when it comes to measuring competitive balance. A win or a loss
simply shows the result of the game; however, it does not tell how competitive the game

4

actually was. Finding a way to measure competitive play may seem impossible, as it is
essentially trying to find a way to measure a fans perception of what competitive play is.
Fortunately, a past time that is as old and as popular as baseball itself, offers a
unique way to measure the fans’ perception of competitive play. Gambling on
competitive events is an age-old pastime that has evolved into a large market . In 2007,
legal bookmaking grossed over $168 million the United States alone (American Gaming
Association). The usefulness of betting lines in measuring competitive play is obvious,
as betting lines offer a way to turn human perception of the competitive ability of a team
into a quantifiable number. Gamblers watch the baseball games and are able to get a
firsthand insight on the true ability of the teams playing. This insight is then used to
predict the outcome of future games. Betting lines differ from win-loss statistics as the
lines are not a binary statistic. The lines show what team is perceived as better and to
what degree.
This paper tackles the question of whether big market spending is affecting the
competitive balance of Major League Baseball through the use of betting lines and a
pricing model adopted from a paper written by Raymond Sauer in 1993. Section II of
this paper presents a review of previous literature on measuring the competitive balance
in baseball. Section III illustrates the usefulness and validity of using betting lines to
measure competitive balance with the help of previous literature on the subject. In
Section IV, I introduce and review both the statistics used in this paper and the pricing
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model used to test them. Section V and VI breaks down the results of the pricing model
test and the conclusion of the paper, respectively.
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2.Literature Review
2.1 Previous Studies of Competitive Balance in MLB
After the 1994 strike and the following five years of Yankee domination, Bud
Selig commissioned a Blue Ribbon Panel to examine the declining level of the
competitive balance in Major League Baseball. Using wins, playoff appearances, playoff
wins, revenue, and payroll as the study’s main criteria, the Blue Ribbon Panel set off to
explore the effect the growing payroll and revenue disparities were having on the
competitive balance of the league. The study came to a strong conclusion in support of
the idea that payroll and revenue disparities were the primary culprits causing the lack of
competitiveness from the small market teams. This conclusion led the Blue Ribbon Panel
to recommend that each team put forty to fifty percent of its local revenue into a
combined pool controlled by the league.
To analyze the relationship between competitive balance and payroll disparities
during 1995-1999, the study split the league into four quartiles ranked by payroll for each
year examined and then compared how successful each quartile was in terms of wins and
playoff success. Using these criteria to measure the competitive balance of the league, it
is no wonder the study came to such strong recommendations as the results were
shocking.
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Table 1- Blue Ribbon Panel’s Results
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Avg.
%
Avg.
payroll Playoff payroll
1995 $46.40
50
1996
57.4
1997
64
1998
78.8
1999
Avg.

80.6
78
97
73
94
84.52

$36.90
37.9
45.3
50.1
55.7

Quartile 3

%
Avg.
Playoff payroll
19.4
22
3
27
6
15.48

$31.40
28.1
35.4
35.4
41

Quartile 4

%
Avg.
%
Playoff payroll Playoff
0 $17.80
0
18.2
0
21.5
0
18
0
20.2
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

* League is divided into 4 quartiles, ranked by payroll with Quartile 1 being the
highest
*Data obtained from the Blue Ribbon Panel ( L e v i n , M i t c h e l , V o l c k e r ,
Will)
As observed from the table above, teams in the top payroll quartile won over 84%
of the playoff games that took place in the following five seasons. This is a stark
contrast to the teams in the bottom two quartiles who won zero playoff games in those
five years! Teams in the 2nd quartile did not fare much better as only one team from the
second quartile made the World Series during this time period. Teams in Quartile 1
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clearly had a stranglehold on post season success. The question that follows is, what
caused Quartile 1 teams to be undeniably head and shoulders above the rest of the
league?
Looking at the graph below, it is quite obvious how one could be drawn to the
conclusion that the driving force of Quartile 1’s dominance during this era was the
growing payroll disparity. During the time period evaluated in the study, the average
payroll of Quartile 1 teams increased by $28 million. This amount was seven times
larger than the $4 million increase in payroll seen by Quartile 4 teams. Coincidently, the
total revenue of Quartile 1 teams had a 71% higher growth rate than the Quartile 4 teams.
Superficially, a link can be drawn between the differing growth rates amongst the
Quartiles and their respective success on the field.
Figure 1-Payroll Growth of the late 90’s
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$70.00
$60.00

Quartile 1

$50.00

Quartile 2

$40.00
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The Blue Ribbon Panel identified local revenue as the main culprit for the
growing disparity. Local revenue accounts for the majority of a team’s overall revenue,
giving larger market teams a natural advantage on being able to invest more in the team
via payroll. The study’s conclusion falls in line with the growing popular sentiment that
small market teams were at a natural disadvantage.
Seven years after the Blue Ribbon Panel report, Elanjian and
Pachamanova(2009) investigated how much the competitive balance had changed in the
league in recent years. Dividing the teams into quartiles, Elanjian and Pachamanova
compared payroll, revenue, and wins for the years following the Blue Ribbon Panel
(2000-2007) to evaluate the effect the current revenue sharing system has had on
baseball. During the time period evaluated, the study found that the revenue and payroll
gaps amongst the Quartiles had diminished in the 2000s. To illustrate this in more detail,
Quartile 1’s payroll in the 1995-1999 post-strike years grew at a staggering 10.42
percent, a figure that dwarfed Quartile 4’s 1.75 percent growth. The opposite happened
in the 2000s where the growth rates had practically reversed, with Quartile 4
experiencing a 5.86% average growth compared to quartile 1’s 1.14%.

Despite the significant progress made in closing the payroll and revenue gaps,
only minor progress was made in improving the regular season success of the teams. To
evaluate this phenomenon further, the authors ran a simple regression on payroll’s effect
on winning percentage. This simple regression was run separately for the late 90s and the
2000s to determine if payroll’s effect on competitive play had changed between the two
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time frames. As evident by the small progress in competitive play despite the large
progress on payroll disparities, the regression showed that payroll had a much smaller
effect on winning percentage in the 2000s. Looking at the table below taken from the
paper, payroll’s effect on winning percentages had shrunk to almost one third of what it
was in the late ‘90s.
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Table 2- Study on Revenue Sharing Results

However, these studies, similar to the media’s perception, assumed market size
was the problem and then set off to gather evidence to support this initial assumption.
This idea was put to the test by a response to the Blue Ribbon Panel report that
questioned whether market size was really the driving factor in the lack of competitive
balance. “Competitive Balance and Market Size in Major League Baseball: a Response
to Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Panel” set out to define market size and then show the effect
that factors correlated to market size had on winning percentage.
When market size was defined by population and per capita income, Schmidt and
Berry(2001) found little correlation between market size and on the field success. For
example, Cleveland experienced great success in the late ‘90s when the large market
teams were said to have gained a massive competitive advantage. Considering Cleveland
ranks 20th as a Metropolitan Statistical Area, this is quite contrary to what would be
expected. Additionally, Boston ranked 10th as a MSA and showed miserable results on
the field. In fact, on a quick glance, the authors found little correlation between MSA
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measures such as per capita income and population and on-the-field success measured by
winning percentage.
Taking an alternative view on the definition of market size, Schmidt and
Berri(2001) turned to revenue and payroll measures, which are how the Blue Ribbon
Panel defined market size. To further explore this relationship of market size and
success on the field, Schmidt and Berri(2001) used the statistical measure of a Gini
coefficient to show how evenly wins were distributed across the league. The Gini
coefficients were with ranked by their relationship to various exogenous factors and
endogenous factors. Doing this allowed the authors to examine how endogenous and
exogenous factors were affecting the competitive balance of the league.
Schmidt and Berri did find some correlation between endogenous factors and
success on the field. However, the interesting aspect here is that this correlation was not
found to be consistent and only seemed to last for brief periods of time. Citing the
failures of the big spending Los Angeles Dodgers and Baltimore Orioles, the authors
hypothesized that market size no matter how it was defined is not the driving force
behind success on the field. Rather, the quality of the team’s front office and
management dictated the quality of the product produced on the field. Furthermore, they
bring up an interesting point on simultaneity of “large market” factors such as revenue
and payroll and success on the field. A better product on the field would be expected to
generate more revenue and in turn a higher payroll. Thus, it is hard to determine whether
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the big payroll teams were good because of their payroll or because their payroll was
high because they were good.

One major assumption being made in all these previous studies was that the
current state of affairs in baseball somehow differed from the historic state of competitive
balance. Considering the Yankees do have twenty seven world championships, this may
not be the case. Fortunately, Schmidt and Berri put this assumption to test in their paper
“Competitive balance and attendance: The case of Major League Baseball".

Schmidt

and Berri actually went back and compared this decade’s state of competitive balance to
that of every decade of the past century. Unlike any of the previously mentioned studies
in this paper, this study put the current state of baseball into the context of the history of
baseball. By doing so, Schmidt and Berri could observe whether the current growth in
payroll gaps was actually causing the competitive state of baseball to differ from
historical levels.

Similar to the previous two studies, this study measures competitive balance off a
team’s record.

Like their previously mentioned paper, Schmidt and Berri (2001)

developed a Gini Coefficient to measure how evenly distributed wins were across the
league over each decade. By calculating a Gini coefficient for each season dating all the
way back to 1901, the authors were able to put into context the supposed current decline
in the competitive balance. With this new found context, the Schmidt and Berri came to
the conclusion that the ‘90s were actually the most competitive decade of the century!
This conclusion is of particular interest because the Blue Ribbon Panel also used wins to
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measure competitive balance.

However, the Blue Ribbon Panel did not put their

conclusion into context of the history of baseball, which was an omission that skewed the
story being told by the statistics they uncovered.

2.2 The Use of Betting Lines to Measure Competitive Play
This is not to say the work done by the Blue Ribbon Panel isn’t without its merits.
It brings up the very important correlation between payroll and post season success in the
1990’s. The question that then follows is: if the 90’s were the most competitive decade
in the history of baseball based on win percentages then why were the top payroll teams
displaying such dominance over the lower three quarters of the league in the post season?
A solid answer may be found in the argument put forth in the paper “Using Betting
Market Odds to Measure the Uncertainty of Outcome in Major League Baseball”. Paul,
Weinbach, Borghesi, and Wilson(2009) illustrate that wins and win percentages may not
be the best statistic to build any type of measure of competitive balance on.
This study sets out to attempt to answer why there was such a large discrepancy in
the fans perception of the competitive balance of the 90s and the work done by Schmidt
and Berri showing that it was actually the most competitive decade ever. To do this the
authors take a unique approach and question whether wins are capturing the whole story
of what is happening during a game. In place of wins the authors turn to betting lines to
measure the change in competitive balance in baseball. Betting lines reflect the
gambling markets expected outcome of a matchup in form a money line. With a higher
money line the more certain the bettors were of the outcome of the game. Making it
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possible to essentially measure the changing level of the fans perception of the
competitiveness of the games over the course of the time period studied (1990-2006).
What the authors found was that fans were increasingly and significantly more
certain of the outcome of the game. The betting lines increased in favor of the favorite by
a total of ten percent over the course of the 1990s. More interestingly, the study found
that the trend continued into the 2000’s. The same decade that saw significant progress in
the payroll gaps between the large and small market teams. The use of betting lines by
the authors allowed a way to bridge the gap between the statistics and the fans perception
of the game that was sorely missing in the previous studies trying to explain the fans
perception of competitive balance based purely off statistics.
While betting lines offer a creative approach to turn human perception into a
quantifiable statistic, they are still biased as they are derived from human perception.
Thus, there is a need to test the efficiency and biasedness of betting lines.

The article

“The Market Efficiency and the Favorite Longshot Bias: The Baseball Betting Market”
does just that. The authors, Linda M. Woodland and Bill M. Woodland(1994), cite
previous literature on racetrack betting as their motivation to examine the baseball betting
market. In this cited racetrack literature, a longshot bias is discovered revealing a market
inefficiency where bettors over bet on heavy underdogs and under bet on favorites. The
authors believe the baseball betting markets resemble a more pure market similar to the
stock market and such inefficiencies will not exist. They put this hypothesis to the test
with three weak form test on market efficiency.
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First, the authors test the efficiency of a single randomly selected baseball game.
A betting line on this game is deemed efficient if the probability of an underdog win does
not differ from the objective probability of an underdog win. Simply, a betting line is
efficient if it’s not being biased by some form of human behavior that would lead bettors
to place bets on underdogs disproportionally to their rational probability of winning. An
example of this type of human behavior would be excessive risk taking. The results of
this test showed an incredibly efficient market with only 3 of 26 lines rejecting the null
hypothesis at a ten percent level. Next, a second test is done with all the lines on the
baseball game aggregated together rather than examined individually. The results of
this test do reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency at the ten percent level.
Turning to a final test, the authors examine if wagering only on underdogs returns
higher profits than would be allowed for in an efficient market. If the strategy of
wagering only on underdogs is inefficiency profitable, the market overvalues favorites.
After running the test, the authors do detect market inefficiency. Particularly, this
inefficiency is significant in games with heavy favorites. While the authors did find
some deviation from consistency, they conclude it is not sufficient enough to exist as a
profitable wagering strategy.
In total, the authors conclude the results of these test verify the baseball betting
market is sufficiently efficient. With this verification, this papers approach of using
betting’s as a measure of competitive balance stands on more concrete grounds. If the
results showed an inefficient market, the betting market would be heavily influenced by
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irrational human behavior such as risk taking or fan bias. This would make betting’s a
poor fit to be used to get an accurate perception of competitive play.
However, this study does offer one concern that needs to be examined in this
paper. A test for reverse long shot bias will need to be tested for in this paper to see if
favorites are being overvalued.
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3. Data Review
This paper uses three main pieces of data: win percentages, betting lines, and
team payroll. These pieces of data were chosen to get a full picture of the story that was
laid out piecemeal in the literature review section. Winning percentages are the classic
measure of competitive balance and will be compared to the results of my new approach.
Team payroll will be used to rank the teams by payroll for each year. By ranking the
teams by payroll, an insight can be gained into the market size debate. Lastly money
lines will be used, because as previously argued they will help develop a more accurate
measure of competitive balance. This section of the paper will give a thorough
examination of the data itself during the years 1989 to 2006.
3.1 Money Lines
In betting the money line shows the payout of a wager placed on the outcome of a
specific game. For example a money line of -170 shows that it would take a wager of
170 dollars to win 100 dollars. This team would be considered a heavy favorite to win,
so the payout is relatively low to compensate. Conversely, a money line of -170 would
allow a better to gamble 100 dollars for a chance to win 170 dollars. This team is an
underdog with a lower perceived chance of winning. Thus, an increased incentive is
needed for gamblers to wager on this team.
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The higher the absolute value of a money line, the more certain gamblers are of
the outcome of that specific match up. In fact, the estimated certainty of the outcome
implied by the money line can actually be calculated by converting money lines into
probability. By converting money lines into probability, the bettor’s forecasted outcome
of a matchup is turned into a quantifiable percentage. Not only does this make
comparing the favorite and underdog lines easier, but also allows for a clean comparison
with winning percentages. For the purpose of this paper, the money lines will be
converted into probabilities. This is done with the simple formula shown below:
For favorites, Money line/(Money line +1)
For underdogs, 1/(Money line+1)
Intrusively the use of betting lines would do a great deal to bridge the gap
between fans perception and the statistics used in studies. Betting lines eliminate a good
deal of fan bias as gamblers have a financial stake in the outcome of the game.
Additionally, betting lines give a fuller picture about the true competitive nature of a
game that classily used statistics cannot offer. For example, a win simply shows the
outcome of the game. The score, be it 10-1 or 1-0, isn’t taken into account. This leaves
much to be desired when trying to precisely evaluate competitive play. Betting lines
eliminate this problem as they are predictions based on the witnessed skill level
differences between the two teams. Betting lines offer a really good midpoint between
human perception and statistics.
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When looking at the league as a whole, the issue with money lines or the
probability derived from money lines is that if you take an average across the league the
average will always be around 50%. Obviously, as one team always wins and one team
always loses a game. This makes for a poor tool to look at for a year to year league wide
comparison. To combat this, an Index of Dissimilarity can be derived to get a superficial
glance of the competitive balance of the league on a yearly basis. The Index of
Dissimilarity will be calculated to show how evenly the probability of winning is spread
across the league. This will illustrate the competitive balance of the league because if the
Index of Dissimilarity is high it shows a lack of competitiveness in the league. With some
teams expected to win a large percentage of the games and some teams not expected to
win many, a high Index of Dissimilarity would really work well to determine years in
which the playing field was not competitive.
The formula used in this paper to compute the I.D. is as follows:
I.D.= .5*Sum |Teams proportion of total teams -Teams percentage of Money Lines
probability of winning|
Moving back to the money line probabilities, an I.D. was computed to show
competitive balance of the league as a whole without respect to payroll. Shown in the
table below are the I.D. calculations for each year from 1989-2006.
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Table 3- Money Line I.D.’s
Year I.D.
1989 0.03048
1990 0.02524
1991
0.0214
1992 0.03071
1993 0.04079
1994 0.03869
1995 0.03514
1996 0.03928
1997 0.03613
1998 0.04929
1999 0.04881
2000 0.04551
2001 0.04662
2002 0.06058
2003 0.05967
2004 0.05283
2005
0.0447
2006 0.04504

Looking at the table, the Index of Dissimilarity was relatively low in the early
90’s indicating that a low reallocation of the team probabilities will have to be done to
make the league perfectly competitive. However, the table show a steady upward trend
in the I.D. as the league became more unbalanced. The fans perception on the state of the
league appears to have been correct as the I.D. almost tripled from its valley in 1991 to its
peak in 2002. The league in fact did become increasingly less competitive in the later
90’s and into the early 2000’s.
One curious observation can be made by comparing the 90’s to the 2000’s. In the
90’s, the top few teams like the Yankees and Braves dominated the decade. While in the
2000’s, the league has seen a new World Series Champion almost every single year. Yet
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this isn’t reflected in the Index of Dissimilarity statistics. The I.D.’s of the 2000’s show
that the league is much less balanced than the 90’s. A less balanced league, but one that
creates a greater variety of champions is certainly an interesting phenomenon. It will be
interesting to see if the winning percentage statistics show a similar story
3.2 Winning Percentages
Winning percentages have classically been used to define the strength of a team
as they show the percentage of games won out of the total games played. Two large
issues with winning percentages exist, however, in the form of team scheduling and
excluding the score of the game. Teams in weak divisions will have an easier time
winning games. This makes a comparison between teams based purely on winning
percentages imperfect. Additionally, the true competitive story of the games is ignored
by winning percentages.
However, it would be lazy for this paper to simply ignore winning percentages. It
is important to know how winning percentages and money lines compare over the time
period examined. Calculating an Index of Dissimilarity for winning percentage really
offers to give an exciting insight. One of the main premises behind using betting lines is
the argument that the whole story isn’t being caught up in classic statistics like winning
percentages. By comparing the two head to head as raw statistics, it wouldn’t allow for a
true comparison. Winning percentages across the league will always average to near fifty
percent. But by comparing how evenly the two are distributed across the league, a
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comparison can be made. If the two differ drastically, it would explain why fans
perception was saying a different story than that of the stat sheet.

Figure 3- Trend of Winning Percentages I.D
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As the graph above shows, the I.D. of winning percentages offers a much
different story than the I.D. of betting lines. While both trends show a similar pattern,
the I.D. of winning percentages is full of peaks and valleys and not a steady drastic
upward trend as shown in the graph of the I.D.’s of betting lines. The I.D. of Money
lines never comes close to reproaching its low value in 1991, whereas the I.D. of
winning percentages approaches its low value on multiple occasions. The I.D.’s of
winning percentages simply seem to be all over the table. For instance, in 1997 during
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the heart of the growing lack of competitiveness as shown by the Yankee domination and
the I.D. of betting lines, the I.D. of the winning percentage is actually at a range wide
low.
The great variation of the I.D.’s of the winning percentages makes it much harder
to piece together a story with the information at hand. However this difficulty tells a
story in itself. Perhaps this variation in I.D. of winning percentages could be used to
explain while reports such as the Blue Ribbon Panel use wins and winning percentages to
show a growing lack of competitive balance. While the paper “Competitive balance and
attendance: The case of Major League Baseball”, shows the league at an all-time high in
terms of competitive balance. An analysis on the variation of winning percentages and
the variation of the conclusions research papers using winning percentages as a measure
of competitive balance would make an interesting paper topic by itself.
3.3 Team Payrolls
Team payrolls are needed to evaluate team’s spending effect on competitive play.
Rather than do a direct analysis on payroll’s effect on competitive play, payroll will
simply be used to divide the league into quartiles. The quartiles will then be compared to
show how they differ with respect to competitive play. Dividing the teams into quartiles
allows for an insight into the debate centered on big market teams having a natural
advantage over small market teams. Additionally, it falls in line with the approach
previous literature has used to tackle this subject. Thus making the results of this paper
suitable for a comparison to previous literature.
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The teams in each quartile will change on a yearly basis as the quartiles are
defined on spending patterns. Rather than a direct comparison on big market and small
market teams, this will give an insight into the spending behavior of teams and its effect
on competitive play. Ranking teams by their spending behavior gives an excellent insight
into payrolls effects on competitive play. A big market team is simply a team that spends
like a big market team should. This avoids the problem of thrifty owners. Additionally,
this ranking and use of payroll falls in line with previous literature. The results of this
paper can be compared to studies like the Blue Ribbon Panel report to see if the big
market teams were actually pulling away as strongly as the report suggested.
Obviously, even the most casual fan can look at team salaries across the league
and see that the landscape has drastically changed over the past two decades. However,
creating an Index of Dissimilarity offers two quick and interesting insights. First, it gives
a rather easy measure to show by how much the gap of the team payrolls has changed on
a yearly basis. Secondly, it gives a rudimentary way to compare how the balance of the
team payroll differs than the balance of competitive play in a single year.
As commonly known, the I.D. shows the phenomena of drastic growth and
divergence in team payrolls across the league. Additionally, it shows how this
divergence has leveled off in the 2000’s. All in all, the I.D. of payroll seems to mirror
that of the betting lines. Both showing steady positive trends that level off at the end of
the data range. However, the largest difference is simply in the raw I.D. itself. The
payroll I.D.’s are much larger than the betting line I.D.’s Showing that the growth in
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payroll gaps is shown to have a much smaller corresponding growth on a teams average
betting line.
Figure 4- Trend of Payroll I.D.
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3.4 Long Shot Bias Test
One issue that needs to be addressed from the literature review section is that of
the reverse long shot bias. A reverse long-shot bias suggest that bettors over bet on
favorites. As discussed in “The Reverse Favourite–longshot Bias and Market Efficiency in
Major League Baseball: An Update” the baseball betting market has evidence that shows it is

influenced by these phenomena. If these phenomena were strong in the baseball betting
market, it would be a large cause of concern for this paper. A strong reverse-long shot
bias would mean this statistic would be ill served as a measure of competitive balance as
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the strength of the favorites would then be exaggerated.

Obviously, if the best team’s

strength was being exaggerated in the betting lines then the league would appear less
competitive than it really is.
To test for the reverse long shot bias, this paper will use a simple test based on
home team betting lines and the percentage of games actually won by the home team.
Simply if the home team wins significantly fewer games than is predicted by the home
team betting line, a reverse-long shot bias exist in this set of data.

Home teams are on

average favored to win throughout this data set, thus making this test suitable to test if
favorites are being overly favored in the betting market.
After converting the home team betting lines into probabilities, a comparison
between probabilities and win percentages is clean and simple. Essentially this test is
comparing the probability of the home team winning against the percentage of games
they actually won. The results can be seen in the table below.
On first glance, the average across all seasons shows that the home team’s
probability of winning was a fairly accurate predictor of wins. Only a slight bias was
seen with the betting lines over predicting home wins by 2.7 percent. However on closer
examination, the probability of winning is shown to be even more accurate.
In eight of the eighteen seasons, the difference between the home team probability
of winning and actual winning percentage is less than one percent. Conversely, the
home team probability of winning is only two or more percent greater than the actual
winning percentage twice. One time being in the hectic strike shortened season of 1994.
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While a slight and consistent bias is seen towards home teams, this bias is not significant
enough to discredit betting lines as a measure of competitive balance.

Overall, betting

lines appear to be a remarkably accurate predictor of the outcome of games.
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4. Test
The goal of this paper is to evaluate how significantly team payroll spending is
affecting the competitive balance of the league. To make this evaluation, this paper
needs to devise a way to quantify competitive play into a statistic that can be compared
on a yearly basis. Essentially, a statistic measuring one team’s strength in comparison to
the rest of the league is needed. Once this statistic is computed, the league can be divided
into payroll quartiles to analyze the relationship between a team being at specific payroll
level and team strength. Finally, this analysis can be looked at on a year to year basis to
find out if any change in the payroll gaps had a corresponding change in team strength
gaps.
As previously stated, the first issue is to develop a statistic to quantify team
strength in relation to the rest of the league. This is a fairly difficult task as traditional
statistics such as wins are heavily influenced by uneven scheduling. Thus, making wins
flawed in comparing team strength when teams are in different divisions or leagues. A
more unique approach is needed. Fortunately, the paper “Fundamentals or Noise?
Evidence from the Professional Basketball Betting Market” offers a statistic that may be
adopted for used of this paper.
In the aforementioned paper, Brown and Sauer(1993) use a pricing model to turn
the point spread lines used in the gambling market into a measure of team strength. The
model used in the paper is shown below:
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NBA game’s Point Spread= Home team advantage coefficient + Sum (Team Ability)
*Dummy Variable if team is home or away + Market information.
The model states that the point spread used by gamblers is essentially computed
by finding the difference in team ability and adding a constant for home field advantage.
Consideration for market information such as injuries is also taken into account.
By plugging the above pricing model into a statistical regression with the point
spread as the dependent variable, coefficients can be calculated to show how much a
team being involved in game effects the point spread.

These coefficients are effectively

measures of team strength. Unlike wins, these coefficients avoid the problem of uneven
scheduling by allowing for a larger variance in the statistical range. A win is simply a
binary statistic that is a 1 or 0. This measure of team strength can be 10 or -8. This
larger range of statistics allows for a more precise insight into team strength in relation to
the rest of the league.
This pricing model can easily be adapted for use in Major League Baseball and
money lines as shown below.
Probability of winning from Money Lines=Home field effects +Sum (Team ability) *
Dummy variable if team is home or away+ Market Effects
Money lines make a more suitable dependent variable in Major League Baseball
as teams such as the 2010 Giants have shown the ability to win a lot of games and the
World Series while having low margin of victories. The low margin of victories comes
from having a dominant pitching staff and a weak offense.
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However, two small tweaks will be made the Dr. Sauer’s pricing model before
use in this paper. The first is that the pricing model will be used to run two separate
regressions. One for each league, to minimize the problem of uneven scheduling. The
second tweak will be done to the coefficient themselves. Simply, the true adjusted
coefficient is the coefficient of the team ability minus the league average team ability.
Leaving a simple interpretation of how much better or worse a team is than the league
average. Additionally, the balance of the league is easily derived from these new
adjusted coefficients by simply looking at the standard deviation and range of the
coefficients.
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5. Results
5.1Team Strength Coefficient Trend Analysis
In the data review section, a very superficial analysis was given on the changing
level of competitive balance over the time period studied. However, this analysis
examined the league as a whole and left a lot of the story behind the competitive balance
of the league untold. A much deeper insight is given with the regression analysis test as
the league is broken down and examined by individual teams. By doing an analysis on
the individual teams, a deeper and more precise analysis can be given on the relationship
between competitive balance and the gap between team payrolls.
From the I.D. of the money lines, the league was seen to get significantly less
balanced. Intuitively, it would be expected that Quartile 1 teams were simply pulling
away as baseball fanatics everywhere argued. The graph below shows this is partially
what did occur.
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Figure 5- Team Strength Coefficient by Quartile
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The graph above indicates three unique trends of competitive balance during the
time period examined. The first trend occurred during 1989 to 1992. The top three
Quartiles were closely grouped together, with Quartile 4 lagging far behind.

Team

strength coefficients being built on the betting markets perception of a team’s strength,
having the top three quartiles grouped so closely together would indicate that the
common perception was that the league was extremely competitive during this time.
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Q3
Q4

The second trend saw Quartile 1 separate itself drastically from Quartile 2 and
Quartile 3. This trend occurred between the years 1993 to 2000. Starting roughly in
1993, Quartile 1’s average team strength coefficient began to rise. Quartile 2’s average
team strength coefficient stagnated and Quartile 3’s average team strength coefficient
dropped dramatically.

Factoring these three growth rates together, the league saw

Quartile 1 teams really begin to display dominance. Considering these team strength
coefficients are based on gamblers perception of a team’s probability of winning,
Quartile 1 teams were expected to win at a very high rate compared to the rest of the
league. This perception clearly was shared by the minds of the public whose cries
against large market team spending grew louder during this time period.
The final trend seen occurred during the years 2001 to 2006. The Index of
Dissimilarity still saw the league becoming increasingly unbalanced during this time
frame. However, the coefficients of team strength show that there was convergence of
Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 teams to move more back in line with Quartile 1 teams.
This trend clearly illustrates why there was such a greater variety of World Series
champions during this time period. The gap between Quartile 1 and Quartile 2 teams
narrowed greatly with Quartile 3 teams trending heavily upwards. Simply, the
dominance of a few teams was lessoned by the emergence of steeper competition from
Quartile 2 and Quartile 3.
Another interesting note about this trend is the fact that the Index of Dissimilarity
did not detect the league becoming more balanced at this time. An easy explanation is
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the steep drop in quality of play from the teams in Quartile 4. Illustrating the problem
with viewing the league as a whole to examine competitive balance, the struggles of
Quartile 4 teams offset the increased quality of play from Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 teams.
The league actually saw much more competition at the top, as evident by the increased
variety of champions, but was seen to show little increase in competitiveness due to a few
teams at the bottom.
5.2 Payroll Trend Analysis
The results of the team strength coefficient regression showed three
distinct trends. The hypothesis put forth by fans as to why these trends occurred falls on
the back of team payroll spending. According to the general public, the trends would
be explained by the rise and fall of large market team spending. This can easily be put to
the test by examining if there was a corresponding change in large market team spending
patterns to go along with these changing trends of competitive balance.
Simply all that needs to be done is to examine the payroll relationship between
Quartile 1 and the other Quartiles during the years in which there was trending
converging or diverging level of competitive balance. For example during the years
1993 thru 2000, Quartile 1’s payroll relationship to Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 should be
diverging compared to the prior years 1989 to 1992. The below shows what should be
expected if payroll was the driving factor behind these trends in competitive balance.
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Table 4- Payroll Trend Analysis
Payroll
compared to
Quartile 1
Quartile 2
Quartile 3

1989- 1993-2000
1992

2001-2006

Close Growing Far apart
Close Growing Far apart

Growing very close
Growing somewhat close

A quick glance at the graph below shows the payroll trends do not correspond to
the trends in team strength as expected. Most notably, Quartile 1’s payroll relationship
with Quartile 3 is relatively stagnant over the entire time period. In fact the only time
period where Quartile 1 makes consistent and significant growth over Quartile 3, is
during the years 2000-2006. The same time period which Quartile 3 closed the gap in
competitive strength!

37

Figure 7- Quartile 1’s Payroll Relationship
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A similar trend is seen with Quartile 1’s relationship with Quartile 2. During
1993-2000, Quartile 1 pulled away significantly from Quartile 2 in terms of team
strength. Quartile 1’s payroll in comparison to Quartile 2 actually went down from 19891995 and really didn’t start pulling away sharply until the 2000’s. The effect seen here is
almost inverse to what was expected.
Putting the graphs trends in more concrete and discernible numbers, the chart
below analyzed the trend in Quartile 2’s payroll in comparison to Quartile 1 and Quartile
2’s quality of play. Quartile 1 experienced rampant success during the mid and late 90’s,
but only increased the payroll gap between itself and Quartile 2 by 2.7%. That rather
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small increase in the payroll gap between the two Quartiles corresponding with Quartile 2
having a huge 23% drops in its average coefficient of team strength.
Table 5- Quartile 1 and Quartile 2 Comparison
Years
Q1 Team Strength % Change Q1/Q2 Team Salary % Change2 Q2 Team %
Strength
Change
1989-1992
0.01011862
1.215090376
0.00665
1993-2000
0.037886767
377%
1.247809792
2.70% 0.00509
-23%
2001-2006
0.0355252
-6%
1.404889414
13% 0.01961
385%

On face value, it seems impractical that Quartile 1 increasing its payroll gap over
Quartile 2 by 2.7% would correspond to Quartile 1 experiencing a 377% growth in team
strength coefficients while Quartile 2 experiences a 2.7% drop.

Going a few years

further, the likelihood that payroll gaps are the driving factor in the competitive balance
between the two Quartiles grows even smaller. During 2001-2006, Quartile 1’s team
strength coefficient dropped 6%. Six percent, despite the fact that it actually increased its
margin in terms of payroll in terms by 13%. Conversely, Quartile 2 was payroll was
actually poorer in comparison to Quartile 1 during this time frame, but increased its team
strength coefficients by 385%.
Logically, team payroll gaps cannot be the driving force affecting the competitive
levels amongst the teams in the league. A small positive change in the payroll ratio in the
90’s saw a huge change in the gap of competitive play, but a much larger positive change
in payroll ration in the 2000’s saw the gap of competitive play shrink. Simply, there is no
conclusive trend.
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6.

Conclusion

Fans have long complained of the big market dilemma in baseball where the
teams in the largest cities had an unfair advantage over the rest of the league. This issue
accumulated fervent support after the New York Yankees reeled off four World Series
wins in five years in the late 1990’s. Numerous studies followed to examine the big
market dilemma and the competitive balance of baseball in general and the conclusions
of the studies varied mostly dependent on the method the authors used to define
competitive balance. This paper examined those studies and saw what could be leading
to drastically different conclusions: classical statistics such as wins do not truly tell how
strong a team’s quality of play is.
This paper elected to use betting lines as the measure of competitive play to offer
a bridge between the stat sheet and the eye test. The paper tested the accuracy of betting
lines, used betting lines to measure league balance as a whole with an Index of
Dissimilarity, and then finally used in a regression analysis test to show betting lines
relationship with team payroll.
With the Indices of Dissimilarity based on the betting lines, the league was seen
to get increasingly and significantly less balanced from 1989 -2006. However, this left a
lot to be explained as while the league was getting increasingly less balanced, there were
a greater variety of World Series champions. Additionally, the Indices of Dissimilarity
do not give an insight into competitive balance with respect to team payroll. While the
payroll gaps and I.D.’s grew correspondingly without looking directly into the
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relationship between the team payroll and a team’s ability, there is no way to get an
accurate picture of what is actually taking place.
To get an insight into the relationship between team payroll and team ability, this
paper needed to calculate a statistic that could accurately be used to compare a team’s
strength with respect to the rest of the teams in the league. Betting lines were chosen as
they forewent problems such as weak divisional play and relied solely on market
perception of the team’s ability. Next, the betting lines were converted into probabilities
and then plugged into a pricing model developed by Raymond Sauer. This pricing model
was run as a statistical regression to return coefficients to show how much a team being
involved in the game positively or negative influenced the money lines. These
coefficients effectively turned the gambling markets perception of a team’s ability into a
quantifiable statistic that could be compared against one another.
These coefficients allowed a clearer insight into the story of competitive balance
than was being told by fans perception, win statistics, or the I.D. of the money lines.
Fans argued that the rampant spending by big market teams was destroying the
competitive balance of the league. Win statistics showed no clear trend giving a clear
indication that the competitiveness of the league was changing hand in hand with the
payroll gaps. The I.D. of money lines supported fan perception that the league was
becoming increasing less balanced.
However, the coefficients for team strength allowed this paper to discover an
aspect that fans and the I.D. of money lines were missing. Early in the time period
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examined, the top three quartiles were grouped closely together. A divergence between
these quartiles reinforced fan’s sentiment that Quartile 1 teams were beginning to
dominant the league. The interesting aspect here, however, occurred in the early 2000’s
with the convergence of the top three quartiles once again. This went relatively
unnoticed when examining the league as a whole, because Quartile 4 teams experienced a
corresponding drop in competitive play.
Evidence of Quartile 1 separating itself in terms of competitive play was found in
this paper. The team strength coefficients saw Quartile 1 drastically become more
expected to win an average random game during the years 1993 to 2000. This is roughly
the time period examined by the Blue Ribbon Panel after an onslaught of criticism about
the competitive balance of the league as onlookers saw the New York Yankees win four
World Series in a five year span.
The Blue Ribbon Panel saw Quartile 1 teams separate themselves in a similar
manner as this paper, but came to a significantly different conclusion why.
Superficially, the Blue Ribbon Panel looked at the overall percent growth of the team
payrolls for each quartile during this time period and saw Quartile 1 grow at a
significantly faster rate than the other three quartiles. This led to the panel to conclude
that team payroll gaps were the driving factor between growing gaps in quality of play
between the teams.
This paper did not take such a shallow look and came to a distinctly different
conclusion. If Quartile 1’s payroll relationship with Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 is

42

examined during different periods where their competitiveness with one another is seen
to be converging or diverging, then relationship between team payroll gaps and gaps in
team ability found by the Blue Ribbon Panel is not so conclusive. In fact, this paper saw
Quartile 1 pull away from Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 in team payroll during the same years
that Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 drastically became increasingly more competitive.
This paper concludes that there have been significant trends and fluctuations of
competitive balance during the time period examined (1989-2006). Due to the inverse
relationship seen with the team payroll relationships and competitive balance gaps in the
2000’s, this paper goes against popular belief and concludes team payroll gaps were not
the cause for the changing level of competitive balance. This paper also finds betting
lines to be a more accurate indicator of competitive balance than win statistics. Previous
literature found little progress made in the 2000’s in terms of competitive balance.
Spurred on by the increased variety of World Series champions, this paper evaluated
these years specifically and found a huge increase in competitive play from Quartiles 2
and Quartile 3. The betting lines picked up information that the win statistics were not
and explained why there have been so many different World Series champions since the
turn of the century.
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Appendices
Appendix A:Team Payroll and Team strength statistics
Table A-1: Payroll Pre-Strike Years by Quartile

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

18,789,068

21,959,322

32,471,417

41,655,348

40,684,405

41,089,948

15,004,775

19,682,500

26,357,695

33,046,003

36,249,276

36,343,494

11,386,841

15,790,928

21,853,881

28,270,810

27,104,429

28,711,147

8,906,594

12,358,832

16,283,156

17,457,361

18,107,769

19,965,192

Table A-2: Team Coefficients Pre-Strike Years by Quartile

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
0.014364 0.009315 0.015694 0.001102 0.020454 0.034427
0.017436 0.009757 -0.00147 0.000871 0.006612 0.00316
0.000823 -0.00098 0.008321 0.014052 -0.00053 -0.00116
-0.03567 -0.01955 -0.02382 -0.02822 -0.02724 -0.03095
Table A-3: Payroll of the late 1990’s

QUARTILE
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

42,188,291

45,214,207

59,148,877

58,778,131

76,048,926

34,079,368

36,078,239

43,667,548

47,550,625

56,318,258

29,039,965

26,662,154

35,133,369

34,914,802

40,590,237

20,526,553

19,847,679

20,263,310

19,876,714

19,616,143
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Table A-4: Team Coefficients of the late 1990’s

Q1

1995
0.024388

1996
0.03726

Q2

-0.00523

0.007464

Q3

-0.00041

-0.00995

Q4

-0.04216

-0.03477

1997
0.03785
0.00475
0.00454
0.02856

1998
0.052302

1999
0.05501

0.031327 0.008085
-0.03837

-0.01152

-0.04426

-0.05109

Table A-5: Payroll of the 2000’s
QUARTILE
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

84,198,334

99,710,432

103,685,097

110,348,552

112,195,608

115,524,488

116,420,317

64,899,120

73,895,442

73,734,760

77,736,667

76,597,656

79,905,863

86,635,973

48,146,458

52,711,375

53,749,448

55,167,637

52,440,906

57,995,460

64,926,954

26,003,881

29,659,179

39,858,312

41,783,976

36,226,884

40,000,700

42,751,579

Table A-6: Team strength coefficients of the 2000’s

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
0.041403 0.034993 0.053894 0.041849 0.02487 0.030414 0.027132
-0.00593 0.023677 0.022057 0.025282 0.016566 0.013955 0.016136
-0.01224 -0.03507 -0.0467
-0.0041 -0.01484 -0.00553 -0.00149
-0.02927 -0.01249 -0.02573 -0.07012 -0.02685 -0.03898 -0.04387

Table A-7: Long Shot Bias

win %
bet line
Difference

99
52%
51%
0%

2000
54%
51%
2%

2001
53%
51%
1%

2002
54%
51%
3%
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2003
56%
51%
5%

2004
54%
51%
2%

2005
55%
51%
4%

2006
55%
51%
4%
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